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Allen: ACLU v. United States Department of Defense: Substantive Differen

CASE COMMENT
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. UNITED STA TES
DEPARTMENT OFDEFENSE SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCE =
SUBSTANTIAL DEFERENCE

JenniferAllen*
I. FACTS

Requesters, the American Civil Liberties Union and American Civil
Liberties Foundation (jointly ACLU) brought action against the
Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for documents
relating to 14 "high value" detainees (HVDs) held at the United States
Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO).' In response to the
request the government released a number of documents, but redacted
"information relating to the capture, detention and interrogation of the
[HVDs]." 2 The ACLU filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, challenging the government's withholding of the
redacted information.
Satisfied that the government had complied with the FOIA request
and that it had provided sufficient reason to justify its withholdings
under an exemption to FOIA,4 the district court granted the
government's summary judgment motion.5 Requesters appealed, but
before the appeal was heard the government reevaluated its redactions
* J.D. expected 2012, University of Florida Levin College of Law; M.A. expected 2012
in Development Practice, University of Florida. She is also a Research Editor of the Florida
JournalofInternationalLaw.
1. ACLU v. U.S. Dep't of Def, 628 F.3d 612, 616 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
2. Id. at 617. Specifically, ACLU's FOIA submission sought all records, including full
transcripts and any submissions made to the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs)
regarding the HVDs - all of whom had previously been held and questioned by the CIA
outside the United States, but were later transferred to GTMO. Id. Upon transfer to GTMO, the
detainees received hearings before the CSRTs. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 617-18. The government relied heavily on an affidavit from the CIA, which
claimed that the information sought by the ACLU was protected under FOIA Exemptions I and
3 as "intelligence sources and methods." Id. at 617. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(I)-(9)(2006) amended
by OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524, for a list of the nine
exemptions from FOIA disclosure. See also infra notes 11-12 (discussing FOIA exemption
criteria).
5. ACLU, 628 F.3d at 618.
481
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to the requested documents,6 and at the government's request, the
appellate court remanded the case.7 After reprocessing and releasing
revised versions of the documents, the government filed another motion
8ent,
which the district court granted.9 The ACLU
for summary jud
again appealed.' The Court of Appeals held, that in withholding the
requested information as "intelligence sources or methods" the
government properly invoked FOIA Exemptions 1" and 3;12 the
requesters could not otherwise compel disclosure of the withheld
information; and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
declining to perform an in camera review.' 3

6. Id. During this time a number of Presidential Executive Orders were enacted, which
included limiting interrogation techniques, declassifying certain documents, and publicly
releasing information. Id.; Exec. Order Nos. 13,491-93, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893-902 (Jan. 27, 2009).
Direct links to these executive orders and relevant memoranda are available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/Presidential-Actions/2009/01 (last visited Oct. 27,
2011). A leaked International Committee of the Red Cross report had also heightened public
awareness on issues of interrogation, government detention centers, and the treatment of the 14
HVDs. ACLU, 628 F.3d at 618. See also INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, ICRC REPORT ON THE
TREATMENT OF FOURTEEN "HIGH VALUE DETAINEES" INCIA CUSTODY (Feb. 2007); Editorial,

The Torture Debate: The Missing Voices, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2009, at A32 (mentioning that
despite expanded public knowledge through the government's memoranda release and the Red
Cross report, a complete record of the government's "abuse" of detainees is still lacking).
7. ACLU, 628 F.3d at 618.
8. Id. The government again relied on a (second) CIA affidavit to defend the redactions
under FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3. Id.
9. Id. (citing ACLU v. Dep't of Def., 664 F.Supp. 2d 72, 79 (D.D.C. 2009)).
10. ACLU, 628 F.3d at 618.
11. Id. at 616, 622-26. "[E]xemption 1 permits the government to withhold information
'specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy' if that information has been 'properly classified
pursuant to such Executive order."' Id. at 618 (quoting 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(1)). In this case, the
government claimed it withheld the information as part of section 1.4 (c) of Executive Order
12958 because the information was classified as an "intelligence source or method." ACLU, 628
F.3d at 619. Executive Order 12958 was superseded by Executive Order 13526. Id at 619 n.1;
Classified National Security Information, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009).
12. ACLU, 628 F.3d at 616, 622-26. "Exemption 3 permits the government to withhold
information 'specifically exempted from disclosure by statute,' if such statute either 'requires
that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the
issue' or 'establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to
be withheld."' Id. at 619 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)). Here, the government withheld the
redacted information pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947 authorizing the Executive to
withhold "intelligence sources and methods" from public disclosure. Id. Specifically, the court
previously held that § 403(i)(1) of the Act qualifies as an exempting statute under FOIA
Exemption 3. Id. (citing Larson v. Dep't of State, 565 F.3d 857, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2009);
Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). See also 50 U.S.C. § 403(2006);
discussion of cases infra Part II.
13. ACLU, 628 F.3d at 627.
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II. HISTORY
CIA v. Sims14 reiterates the importance of FOIA, "call[ing] for broad
disclosure of government records;" 15 however, the Supreme Court also
clarified that in the Act Congress tempers such disclosure as required by
the public interest.16 In Sims, requesters challenged the CIA's
withholding of information on institutions and researchers that were a
part of the CIA-funded MKULTRA project. 17 Declining to disclose the
information, the CIA claimed the Exemption 3 to FOIA18 because that
information included "intelligence sources and methods." 9 Agreeing
with the CIA's classification of the information, the Supreme Court
found that Congress' express intention was to grant "broad authority" to
the CIA20 to protect all its "intelligence sources and methods." 21 The
14. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985).
15. Id. at 166.
16. Id. at 167. By providing nine exemptions in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), "Congress recognized
... that public disclosure is not always in the public interest." Id. For further example of cases
discussing the spirit of the FOIA under various exemptions, see United States v. Landano, 508
U.S. 165 (1993); Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
17. Sims, 471 U.S. at 162-64. MKULTRA involved research and development projects
that studied the use of biological, chemical, and radiological materials capable of altering human
behavior. Id. at 161. The project contracted out numerous subprojects, involving "[a]t least 80
institutions and 185 private researchers"- many of whom were unaware they were dealing with
the CIA. Id. at 162.
18. Id. at 163-64. The CIA released the names of 59 institutions that had consented to
disclosure, but it did not make an attempt to contact individual researchers. Id. at 163 n.7. See
supra text accompanying note 12.
19. Sims, 471 U.S. at 164. At issue in Sims was whether § 102(d)(3) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.C.S. § 403(d)(3)) qualified as a withholding statute under FOIA
Exemption 3, and whether the information on researchers and institutional affiliations
constituted "intelligence sources" under § 102(d)(3) and was therefore protected from
disclosure. Id. at 167, 178.
20. Id. at 168-69, 177. Specifically, the Court found that through the "plain meaning," the
legislative history, and the Presidential origins of § 102(d)(3), Congress intended to grant the
Director of CIA authority to protect all sources of intelligence as required by the CIA to perform
its duties. Id. at 169-70, 173. Accordingly, because the MKULTRA research was part of the
CIA's intelligence-gathering function, the court held the Director "was within his statutory
authority to withhold the names of the MKULTRA researchers [as 'intelligence sources'] from
disclosure under the FOIA." Id. at 173-74.
21. See id at 169-70. Under § 102(d)(3), the Director could withhold even superficially
innocuous information from FOIA disclosure if it might lead to the identity of an intelligence
source. Id. at 176-79. According to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals improperly
narrowed the Director's authority when it limited the definition of "intelligence sources" to only
the sources in which the CIA had to guarantee confidentiality to obtain information (thereby
excluding publically available information). Id. at 169, 174-78. Such a definition contravened
the Executive's power and "overlook[ed] the practical necessities of modem intelligence
gathering." Id. at 169. Instead, the Supreme Court recognized that "[a]n intelligence source
provides, or is engaged to provide, information the Agency needs to fulfill its statutory
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Court made clear that the judiciary is not to substitute its judgment for
that of the Executive in matters regarding classification decisions vital
to national security. 22 Concurring, Justice Marshall expressed
discontent with the majority opinion's sweeping recognition of
"intelligence source" 23 and cautioned that such a definition 24
"thwart[ed] congressional efforts to balance the ublic's interest in
information and the Government's need for secrecy.'
Even before Sims, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
typically accorded the Executive great deference in FOIA cases. For
example, in Lesar v. U.S. Dep't of Justice,26 the court rejected an
attempt to compel disclosure of FBI records pertainin to investigations
of a high-profile subject - Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Claiming FOIA
Exemption 1, among others, the FBI withheld information in the interest
of national defense. Refusing to debate the potential harm to national
security, the FBI's affidavit, which supported its classification decision,
received "substantial weight" 29 and the court held the government's
summary judgment was warranted.3 o Of significance in this case, the
Lesar court found that even illegal activities (or those that were later
deemed illegal) that produced classified information, satisfied
Exemption l's protection of sources or methods. 3 ' The court declined to
obligations." Id. at 177.
22. See id. at 176, 179-80. The Court reasoned that judges making after-the-fact
determinations on whether an intelligence source required confidentiality not only compromises
intelligence efforts, but also breaches the separation of powers. See id. Because the Director was
familiar with the magnitude of risks at stake, his decision on whether to disclose information
should be accorded great deference. Id. at 179-80.
23. Id. at 182 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall agreed with the Court of
Appeals' definition, believing that the majority stretched the "intelligence source" exception
found in § 102(d)(3) "beyond its natural limit." Id. at 182, 184, 186 (Marshall, J., concurring).
See supra text accompanying note 21.
24. Justice Marshall felt that such a definition created "an irrebuttable presumption of
secrecy over an expansive array of information in Agency files, whether or not disclosure would
be detrimental to national security" and "undermin[ed the] explicit effort to keep from the
Agency broad and unreviewable discretion over . . . information." Id. at 191 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
25. Id. at 182 (Marshall, J., concurring).
26. Lesar v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
27. Id. at 475.
28. Id. at 476-79.
29. Id. at 481-82. See infra text for discussion of "substantial weight" in Larson v. Dep't
of State, 565 F.3d 857, 864 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
30. Lesar, 636 F.2d at 483.
31. Id. The court said "[a]lthough the FBI's surveillance of Dr. King strayed beyond the
bounds of its initial lawful security aim, that does not preclude the possibility that the actual
surveillance documents and . .. materials that comment upon those documents may nevertheless
contain information of a sensitive nature, the disclosure of which could compromise legitimate
secrecy needs." Id.
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rule directly on that issue, and instead focused on whether the
documents were properly classified according to the executive order's
criteria.3 2 Concurring, the issue lingered for Judge Bazelon, who
questioned whether reports generated through illegal means deserved
protection under FOIA.33 He reasoned that such a claim was not
foreclosed in future cases but agreed to reject the appellants' request
based on the "substantial weight" of the agency affidavit. 3 4
Fitzgibbon v. CIA,3 5 decided in light of Sims, built on the principles
from that case and Lesar. In Fitzgibbon,36 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia stressed the function of foreign intelligence in
disposing of Fitzgibbon's claim.3 7 Not surprisingly, the court found
virtually "all intelligence sources" fell within the purview of the CIA's
protection power "regardless of their provenance."38 Because it was
"not the province of the judiciary . . . to determine whether a source or
method should be . . . disclosed,"3 9 the CIA's withholding records
pursuant to Exemption 3 was deemed valid.4 0 The Fitzgibbon court
32. Id at 483. When the procedural and substantive standards of the governing Executive
Order have been followed as in this case, heightened scrutiny in the form of an in camera
document review is unnecessary. Id. at 483-85.
33. Id. at 492 (Bazelon, J., concurring). The requester in this case claimed Exemption 1
"should not apply to agency materials produced without a lawful purpose." Id.
34. Id. (Bazelon, J., concurring).
35. Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
36. Fitzgibbon involved FOIA Exemption 3 and the same withholding statute, 50 U.C.S.
§ 403(d)(3), that was at issue in Sims. Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 761. In explaining the standard of
review, the court reminded that "Exemption 3 differs from other FOIA exemptions in that its
applicability depends less on the detailed factual contents of specific documents; the sole issue
for decision is the existence of a relevant statute and the inclusion of withheld material within
the statute's coverage." Id. at 761-62 (quoting Ass'n of Retired R.R. Workers v. United States
R.R. Ret. Bd., 830 F.2d 331, 336 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Thus, having ample support that § 403(d)(3)
was a valid withholding statute; the Fitzgibbon Court was tasked to determine whether the
withheld material related to intelligence sources or methods. Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 761-62.
37. Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 762-65. While never defining "foreign intelligence function"
directly, the court implied it was a function that sought to gain "substantive intelligence
information," not merely information collected through a country's actual foreign intelligence
services. Id. Reiterating the Supreme Court in recently-decided Sims, all intelligence sources,
innocuous information, unwitting or potential sources of information, information from ordinary
private citizens, and even methods generally known such as physical surveillance or
interviewing, were part of that function. Id. (citing Sims, 471 U.S. at 171, 176-77).
38. Id. at 762 (quoting Sims, 471 U.S. at 171).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 764 (holding that district court had properly applied Sims and properly
interpreted § 403(d)(3) and Exemption 3 in this case). Id. Although the court recognized its prior
decisions regarding the scope of Exemption 3 (under section 403(d)(3)) and that of Exemption 1
were not entirely consistent, the court resolved itself that "these exemption statutes were
congressionally designed to shield processes at the very core" of the foreign intelligence
function. Id. Thus, "the CIA may properly withhold domestic [intelligence] sources as it would
foreign sources." Id.
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cautioned against courts from making their own determinations on
FOIA disclosure and, in effect, it dissuaded district courts from
undertaking in camera review of the withheld information.4 1
Next, the D.C. Circuit court tackled whether, despite a validly
claimed FOIA exemption, disclosure of information could nevertheless
be compelled due to the CIA's implicit waiver of its exemption as a
42
result of having previously publically discussed the matter. The Court
reiterated its three-part test from Afshar v. Dep 't of State,4 3 to determine
whether that information had been "officially acknowledged" which, in
turn, could compel disclosure.4 4 The court found that "the information
requested must be as specific as the information previously released. [It]
must match the information previously disclosed . . . . [And it] must

already have been made public through an official and documented
disclosure." 45 Because the information requested did not match the
content of the prior disclosure, the FOIA requester in this case failed to
show an implicit government waiver of Exemption 3.46
Recently, in Larson v. Department of State,4 7 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia reaffirmed its "deferential posture" to the

41. See id. at 762-66. In Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 578 F.Supp 704, 709, 717 (D.D.C. 1983)
(quoting Lesar, 636 F.2d at 481) the district court was concerned over the breadth of
"intelligence sources and methods" and performed a limited in camera review of agency
affidavits to determine "whether unauthorized disclosure of the materials reasonably could be
expected to cause the requisite harms." Thereafter, the court ordered disclosure; it had also
ordered disclosure of information it believed the government had previously disclosed.
Fitzgibbon, 578 F.Supp at 722. The court of appeals did not think this was a place where the
trial court should have ventured, because "[tihe assessment of harm to intelligence sources,
methods and operations is entrusted to the Director of the Central Intelligence, not to the
courts." Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 766.
42. Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 765-66. In this instance, the public disclosure was not by the
CIA or executive, rather, it was by a congressional committee. Id. at 765.
43. Afshar v. Dep't of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1133 (D.C.Cir.1983).
44. Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 765.
45. Id. (citing Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1133).
46. Id. at 765-66. Fitzgibbon's FOIA request concerned records that alleged a CIA station
in the Dominican Republic (1956), which did not match the records used to confirm the station's
presence during the congressional testimony (1960-1961). Id. at 766. In discussing the Afshar
test, the court noted the following: the "critical difference" between an official and unofficial
disclosure; the potential harm that could still result with official acknowledgement of publically
available information; that even "official disclosure did not waive the protection to be accorded
to information that pertained to a later time period." Id. at 765 (citing Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1133).
Finally, the court broached the subject of whether a congressional committee disclosure could
trigger "official acknowledgement" by the Executive and thereby bind it. Id. at 765. While not
resolving the Constitutional issue, the court seemed very aware of separation of powers and the
implications that such a practice could have on intelligence sources or to undermine the
Executive. Id. at 766.
47. Larson v. Dep't of State, 565 F.3d 857 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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"uniquely executive purview" of national security in FOIA cases. 48 In
Larson, the requesters challenged the government's withholding of
documents, under FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3, related to Vast violence
that they or their family members suffered in Guatemala. 9 Requesters
also challenged the district court's decision not to perform an in camera
review of the withheld documents.so
In explaining the standard of review, the court determined that
ultimately the agency claiming an exemption bears the burden of proof
to sustain its action and it usually does this by justifying its decisions to
withhold in an affidavit. 5 1 "Substantial weight," however, is given to
agency affidavitS52 and summary judgment is warranted "when the
affidavits describe the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably
specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls
within the claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either
contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith."53
When the agency meets its burden, the court need not inquire any
further; significantly, "in camera review is neither necessary nor
appropriate." 54 Thus the requesters' desires to promote "greater
disclosure" and have the court serve as a check on the government's
claims by independently reviewing the withheld documents were
quickly extinguished.
While the Larson court stated that FOIA grants district courts the
authority to erform in camera review if needed to determine a claimed
exemption,s FOIA does not compel "the exercise of that option."57

48. Id. at 865 (quoting Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918,
926-27 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). The court noted its long-held practice to defer "to executive affidavits
predicting harm to national security," and that it has "found it unwise to undertake searching
judicial review." Id.(quoting Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d 918 at 927). The court
explained that the "judiciary is in an extremely poor position to second-guess predictive
judgments" made by agencies on whether harm to national security would result from
intelligence source disclosure. Id. (quoting Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d 918 at
928)(quotation omitted).
49. Id. at 860.

50. Id.
51. Id. at 862. The circuit court reviews the justifications de novo. Id. (citing Ctr. for
Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 926; 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)).
52. Larson, 565 F.3d at 864 (quoting Ctr. for Nat'l. Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 927)
(referring to Exemption t in this instance).
53. Id. at 862 (quoting Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
54. Id. at 870. As stated earlier in the case, "the court should not conduct a more detailed
inquiry to test the agency's judgment and expertise or to evaluate whether the court agrees with
the agency's opinions." Id. at 865.
55. Id. at 869.
56. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)).
57. Id. (quoting Juarez v. Dep't of Justice, 518 F.3d 54, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
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Concerning national security issues, in camera review is a "last resort"
and not a place where the court should venture merely on the "theory
that 'it can't hurt.'" 5 9 Not surprisingly, in Larson, the government's
summary judgment motion was justified based on the agency's
affidavit.60

III. INSTANT CASE
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
followed its longstanding precedent in FOIA cases involving
government exercise of Exemption 1 and 3, and squarely showed that
second-guessing an agency's judgment (on whether harm to national
security would result from intelligence sources or methods disclosure)
was not a routine undertaking for the court. 6 1 Relying on Sims and its
progeny, the court quickly found that the withheld information on
detainee capture, interrogation, and detention, was subject to exemption
because the information satisfied the Sims definition of "intelligence
sources and methods." 63
According to the court, Exemption 3 did not suggest that specific
collection techni ues could render unprotected sources and methods
previously used. Of importance regarding Exemption 1, the court
adopted Lesar's majority opinion and found there was no legal support
58. Id. at 870 (quoting Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
59. Id. (quoting Ray. v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
60. Id.
61. See ACLU v. Dep't of Def., 628 F.3d 612, 619, 622-26 (D.C. Cir. 2011). See also,
discussion of cases supra Part II; Centerfor Nat'1 Security Studies, 331 F.3d at 928 ("reject[ing]
any attempt to artificially limit the long-recognized deference to the executive on national
security issues. Judicial deference depends on the substance of the danger posed by disclosure
- that is, harm to the national security - not the FOIA exemption invoked."). But see Nat'1
Security Studies, 331 F.3d at 939-40 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (questioning whether a "heightened
deference" by the court in this case regarding national security matters amounted to judicial
acquiescence).
62. ACLU, 628 F.3d at 618-22. Chief Judge Sentelle, who authored the opinion in the
instant case, also authored the opinions in Larson, Fitzgibbon, and Centerfor Nat'1 Security
Studies.
63. See id at 622-26. The ACLU challenged the government's claimed exemptions (1
and 3) on several grounds, including that the withheld information had been declassified and
was available to the public, that the Presidential ban on the future use of certain interrogation
techniques made past practices and information involving those techniques no longer
"protectable" as "intelligence sources and methods," that the government's authority to classify
information did not extend to detainee personal experiences and observations, and that
Exemption 1 could not be used because national security would not be impaired by disclosure.
Id. at 620.
64. Id. at 622. Like in Sims, the government claimed Exemption 3 under 50 U.S.C. §
403(i)(1), so the court was well familiar with its authority. See id. at 619.
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for the proposition that illegally obtained information cannot be
properly classified and withheld pursuant to a FOIA exemption. 65
Because the CIA's justification for invoking exemptions (as identified
in its affidavit) satisfied the "logical" and "plausible" standard,6 6 the
affidavit received "substantial weight." 67 Having found that the
government satisfied its (light) burden "on the basis of the CIA's
affidavit alone," the court held that government properly invoked
Exemptions 1 and 3.
Addressing the question of whether the withheld information had
been "officially acknowledged" (through previous release of
declassified documents and as a result of the leaked Red Cross report),
the court revisited its three-part test as identified in Fitzgibbon.
Relying heavily on the CIA affidavit, which purported "substantive
differences" in information content, the court upheld that the ACLU did
not show sufficient similarity between the requested information and
that which was publically available.7 0 Moreover, because the leaked
report was neither a government document nor released through official
means, the court was "hard pressed" to understand the ACLU's
arguments that attempted to tie the government's hands based on
unauthorized disclosure.7 1 Finding on these bases that the ACLU had
already failed the "officially acknowledged" test, the court dismissed
the ACLU's argument that the requested information was so widely
disseminated it could not cause harm.72
Finally, as a separate matter, the court addressed the appropriateness
of in camera review.7 3 Relying on the standard from Larson, and
finding no bad faith on the part of the CIA, the instant court stressed
65. ACLU, 628 F.3d at 622.
66. Id. at 625.
67. Id. at 625-26.
68. Id. Specifically, by concluding that the exemptions validly apply, the instant court
held that the prohibition on future use of certain interrogation techniques and detention did not
preclude withholding of such information as a valid exemption (under Exemption I and 3) and
agency-classified detainee records from detainee personal observations could also be withheld
pursuant to Exemption 1. Id. at 622-26. On the latter point, the court said "[tjhere is simply no
legal support for the ACLU's argument that the government lacks the authority to classify the
information withheld from the CRST documents." Id. at 623.
69. Id. at 620-21.
70. Id The requesters failed to show that the specific information they sought was
already in the public domain - the previously released documents were more general in nature,
not containing "comprehensive description[s] of the actual capture, detainment, or interrogation
of any specific detainee." Id. at 621.
71. Id
72. Id. at 625. The court, however, reminded that even if information is available in the
public domain, official disclosure could still cause "cognizable harm under a FOIA exemption.
Id. (citing Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
73. ACLU, 628 F.3d at 626-27.
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that the discretion to conduct in camera review ultimatel rests in the
hands of the trial court, which had deemed it unnecessary. In fact, the
instant court found that the government showed good faith by
voluntarily reprocessing documents after the President declassified and
publically released others, so it "decline[d] to penalize a government
agency for voluntarily reevaluating and revising its FOIA
withholdings."7 Because the instant case involved national security
76
issues, the court reminded that in camera review was a last resort.

IV.

ANALYSIS

Since Marbury v. Madison was decided in 1803,n the relative
powers of the three branches of government, and just how much judicial
deference to the executive is due, has loomed large in the backdrop of
American court cases. 8 The challenge of balancing the public's interest
in information and transparency under FOIA against the government's
need for secrecy is one the courts routinely face. 79 The instant case was
no exception.
A. Expansive Standardof Deference
"Given the Supreme Court's sweeping language in Sims,"80 coupled
with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia's longstanding
practice to accord deference to agency decisions (with little explanation
beyond that the information is plausibly or logically classified), it is no
surprise in the instant case that the court held strong to its deferential
position on matters of national security. In many ways this case mirrors
function
Fitzgibbon concerning the classification of material since the
81
of foreign intelligence was what mattered to the court. With the
74. Id.
75. Id. at 627 (citing Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 753-54 (D.C. Cir.
1981)).
76. Id. (citing Larson, 565 F.3d at 870).
77. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
78. See, e.g., id at 165-67, 173-77; EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 84 (1973), superseded by
statue, Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2, 88 Stat.
1561; Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 937-52 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(Tatel, J., dissenting); Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1190-95 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
79. See generally U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749 (1989); Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976); Adm'r, FAA v.
Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975), supersededby statute, Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub.L.
No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241.
80. Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 764.
81. See ACLU, 628 F.3d at 622-26 (explaining how the redacted information fell under
the CIA's purview to withhold.). Necessity of confidentiality, as Justice Marshall, and the lower
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definition of "intelligence sources or methods" virtually unrestrained,
Justice Marshall's concerns are again raised that "information is per se
subject to withholding as long as it is relate[s] to the Agency's
'intelligence function"' 8 2 as nearly all information might possibly be
subject to FOIA exemption. 83
B. Legality Not Required
By adopting the Lesar majority opinion, the instant court answers
Judge Bazelons's query in that case. In the court's view, lawfully
obtained information was not a prerequisite to classifying information
and claiming protection under a FOIA exemption.8 5 Changes in specific
practices, circumstances, or techniques did not render information
unprotected as a result of methods used to collect it. 86 Indeed, FOIA is
not based on how the information is obtained; rather, what matters is
whether the requested information properly fits within the exemptions.
It triggers procedural questions such as whether the government may
assert the privilege (exemption), whether the information is properly
classified, and must that information be shielded to avoid harm.
court in Sims v. CIA, 471 U.S. 159, 186, 189-90 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) proposed did
not matter: experiences and information submitted by detainees to the Combatant Status Review
Tribunals could properly be withheld as an intelligence source or method. ACLU, 628 F.3d at
623.
82. Sims, 471 U.S. at 190 (Marshall, J., concurring).
83. See id. at 190-92 (Marshall, J., concurring). In addition to the expansive definition, at
the crux of the issue for Justice Marshall was the court accepting the government's argument
under Exemption 3 rather than Exemption 1, which, in his view, worked to circumvent
Congressional procedures and a required showing of compliance with an executive order. Id.
Justice Marshall seemed concerned that the court might be returning to its reasoning in EPA,
410 U.S. 73, wherein the court believed it was not qualified to determine if a withholding
satisfied Exemption 1 criteria; however, Congress made clear that the judiciary's role in
performing in camera review was essential to balancing disclosure with national security. Sims,
471 U.S. at 188-89 & n.5 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also Judge Tatel's dissent in Ctr.for
Nat'1 Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 942-45 (discussing that the withheld information and
government-alleged harms must be sufficiently supported, such as through an affidavit, not from
the court merely adopting the government's position; asking important questions does not
"second guess" the government's judgments but ensures the court is doing the job Congress
assigned it by requiring a "rational explanation of its reasons for claiming exemption from
FOIA's disclosure requirements.").
84. See supra discussion of Lesar.
85. ACLU, 628 F.3d at 622.
86. Id; see supra text accompanying note 31.
87. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9).
88. See Sims, 471 U.S. at 183 (Marshall, J., concurring) (explaining that with Exemption
1, it is for the court to determine "whether documents are correctly classified, both substantively
and procedurally."); Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[T]he purpose of
national security exemptions to the FOIA is to protect intelligence sources before they are
compromised and harmed, not after ..... ).
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C. An IrrebutablePresumption?
The court's practice of granting "substantial weight" to agency
affidavits has virtually created an "irrebutable presumption"-one that
most (if not all) requesters will be unable to refute.8 9 After this case, in
the District of Columbia Circuit, a requester's burden is very high to
obtain sought-after information in light of a government assertion of
Exemptions 1 and 3; to triVer the "officially acknowledged" waiver,
the burden is even greater. While not a per se rule, requesters may
well argue that the practice of not performing in camera reviews, and
thereby going on blind reliance on potentially self-serving agency
affidavits, leaves little room but to conclude anything other than the
Executive is operating behind a judicially-sanctioned "veil of
secrecy."9 '
However, the instant case demonstrates there is nothing to suggest
that an agency will not operate with a presumption of openness.92
Because FOIA applies to all requesters, not just U.S. citizens, to err on
the side of deference and judicial economy in not conducting in camera
reviews, as the instant court did, 94 is arguably a favorable public policy
given the dangers potentially presented by a judicial error in overexposure of sensitive information. 95 Undoubtedly, by not allowing a
89. See ACLU, 628 F.3d at 619 (discussing the government's light burden).
90. See id. at 621-22. To compel disclosure in the face of an exemption, a plaintiffrequester needs specificity and exactness: the requester must not only identify the specific
information in the public domain but also show that information matches what is being
withheld. Id.
91. Sims, 471 U.S. at 182 (Marshall, J. concurring). Justice Marshall's concerns that the
"presumption of secrecy" "relieves the Agency of the burden" of showing more, are alive and
well. Id. at 191.
92. See ACLU, 628 F.3d at 618 (discussing the government's voluntary reviewing the
redacted information due to executive orders). See also Memorandum from President Obama for
the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on the Freedom of Information Act, Office
of the White House (Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/freedominformation-act (establishing that agencies should operate under a presumption of openness in
FOIA disclosure and directing the attorney general to issue new FOIA guidelines);
Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies Concerning the Freedom of
Information Act, Office of the Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Mar. 19, 2009),
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/foia-memo-march2009.pdf (encouraging agencies not to withhold
information simply because they may legally do so).
93. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(3)(A); see, e.g., FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1180-83
(2011) (discussing "person" as defined under the Administrative Procedures Act).
94. See ACLU, 628 F.3d at 625-26. The affidavit upon which the court relied described
the information withheld from each requested document, whether that information fell under
Exemption I or 3, and attested to the harm that could result from disclosure. Id.
95. The danger lies either in mistakes made in a court's handling of the classified
information during an in camera review, or in the grave nature of the harm resulting from a
mistake in ordering the release of classified information. As shown in the cases discussed, the
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leaked report or insufficiently similar information to satisfy "officially
acknowledged," the instant court preserved the sanctity of a
government's asserted privilege. Unresolved, still, is whether a parallel
official disclosure could serve to bind a different agency.
V. CONCLUSION
Indisputably, a substantial difference in expertise regarding handling
classified materials and issues exists among the branches of
government, and separation of powers implies some deference. As a
practical matter, there are strong arguments for the necessity to defer to
Executive expertise in FOLA cases,9 6 as well as judicial restraint from
compelling the Executive to disclose classified information despite its
facially valid claim of an exemption under FOIA. While the burden
remains on the agency to support its exemption, that burden is a light
one; meanwhile, plaintiffs face a severe burden to compel information
once an agency cites plausible or logical support in an affidavit. 97
By strengthening the government's ability to shield information from
public scrutiny without requiring evidence beyond the agency affidavit,
the instant court does not appear to probe aggressively enough to
promote transparency in government even on issues of political and
social importance. 9 8 Such a practice begs the question: is there such a
thing as too much deference? 99 Until this question is answered, claims
Executive is arguably in the best position to weigh potential harm to national security and in
most cases such deference is likely warranted. See Larson, 565 F.3d at 864; Fitzgibbon, 911
F.2d at 766.
96. In most instances, it seems reasonable to operate under the presumption that the
Executive is proceeding in good faith on its classification decisions, and that it would have far
too much to lose if it took this role lightly.
97. This is not to suggest that each FOIA request that tangentially matches previously
disclosed material should somehow compel disclosure or that plaintiff's bar should necessarily
be lower in the average case. Obviously, there are true risks to national security through the
disclosure of intelligence sources and methods, but as the definition of intelligence sources or
methods continues to expand, more and more seemingly innocuous information might fall under
the parameters of exemptions, thereby frustrating the purpose of FOIA.
98. Arguably, the treatment of the high-value detainees is of political and social
importance-the lawfulness of the conduct of service members and government employees is
inherently a matter of public concern. Under current FOIA practices, citizens may feel as though
they are denied the opportunity to fully scrutinize the operation and activities of their
government. Within his first week in office, President Obama shed light on the importance of
both issues of transparency in government and detention with the passage of a number of
memoranda and executive orders. See text and (Presidential) sources cited supra note 6.
99. In a case like the instant one, involving compelling matters (a politically sensitive
question and trillion dollar war), however, the bar might be just too high for requesters because
the balance is tipped too far in favor of the Executive. Perhaps in such cases--especially those
where the government has been trying hard to publicly rally support, yet at the same time
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of harm to national security will likely trump those of freedom of
information and "[i]n the face of doubt, openness will [not] prevail." 00
As Judge Bazelon said in his concurrence in Lesar, "[r]esolution of the
tensions between these risks and the purposes of FOIA must await
another day."10

wants to prevent the public from peeking behind the curtain, requiring in camera review and
making that review a matter of record, rather than accepting the agency affidavit at face value,
should be considered. FOIA statutorily builds in a check, and exercising that check may help to
ensure the integrity of agency affidavits and avoid them from becoming a mere formality.
However, under the current law, a decision by a trial court to not perform an in camera review is
not only not an abuse of discretion, it is in practice discouraged; according "substantial weight"
to the agency's determination as reflected in its affidavit is deemed consistent with the statute.
See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 937, 951 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(Tatel, J., dissenting). In his dissent in Nation Security Studies, Judge Tatel was concerned over
the majority's uncritical deference to the government's explanations for its withholding under
FOIA Exemptions 3 and 7, and the court's filling in the gaps of the government's case thereby
violating separation of powers and "eviscerat[ing] both FOIA itself and the principles of
openness in government that FOIA embodies." While the court has accorded "heightened
deference" to the Executive concerning FOIA Exemptions I and 3 on matters of national
security, it is not necessarily appropriate in all instances or with other claimed exemptions. Id. at
939-40, 951-52 (Tatel, J., dissenting). See also supra text accompanying note 83.
100. President Obama's Memorandum, supra note 92.
101. Lesar v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The inherent
tensions of FOIA, as highlighted in the cases discussed throughout this Comment and witnessed
with regular presence before the Supreme Court (five FOIA-related cases have been decided so
far this year) are not likely to be resolved any time soon.
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